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Relegating the mechanics lien laws of Colorado to the field of
oil and gas law is an involved subject because of the complexities
in the existing statutes and decisions, and because of the history of
statutory enactment, amendment, repeal and reenactment, the
ultimate yield of which is confusing to the practitioner. It seems
impossible to state with certainty whether the present lien rights
applicable to oil and gas operations exist by virtue of one, two or
even three stautory enactments, and it is this problem which has
greatly extended the scope of this examination beyond our initial
contemplation.
Because of the length of the article it is necessary to submit its
published form in a series of three installments. In this first published portion of the paper we attempt to trace the legislative history of the present Colorado lien laws in an effort to ascertain which
statutory laws now govern lien rights in the petroleum industry. In
* The authors acknowledge with gratitude the assistance of
Hubert Weinshienk in the preparationof this paper.
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the second of the installments we determine the parties who enjoy
the right to assert the lien, the content and recording requirements
for the lien statement, and the nature of the property and the character of ownership interests to which the lien may attach. In the
concluding section of the paper, questions of priority and enforcement will be discussed. Suggestions for avoidance of lien liability
will also be tendered together with our notes as to the deficiency
judgment liability of various types of oil investors and operators.
Some suggested forms will also be submitted.
What Law Governs:
During the years 1861 to 1900 there were seventeen statutory
enactments, repeals, re-enactments, transcriptions and amendments
to the mechanics lien laws in Colorado. None of these are considered
significant to the discussion here except the Act of 1899,' which
constituted a general repeal and reenactment of the former lien
laws and which constitutes the source of our present general
mechanics lien law. It is this act 2 which is referred to herein as the
"general lien law."
The Act of 19033 was the first specific statute providing for lien
rights arising out of drilling operations. Because of its significance to
certain supreme court decisions, it is desirable to set forth its terms
in detail. They are:
"Section 1. That any person or persons, company or corporation, who perform labor or furnish material or supplies
for constructing, altering or repairing, or for the digging,
drilling or boring, operating, completing or repairing of any
gas well, oil well or any other well, by virtue of a contract
with the owner or his authorized agent, shall have a lien to
secure the payment of the same upon such gas well, oil well,
or such other well, and upon the materials and machinery
and equipment and supplies so furnished, and in case the
contract is with the owner of the lot or land, then such lien
shall also be upon the interest of the owner of the lot or land
upon which the same may stand, and in case the contract is
with the lease holder of the lot or land then such lien shall
also be upon the interest of the lease holder on the lot or
land upon which the same may stand or in relation to which
such material or supplies are furnished.
"Sec. 2. That in perfecting and enforcing the right herein
given, the procedure indicated in the laws of this State, and
the remedies and rights given, in the statutes of and concerning 'Liens of Mechanics,' as the same may now, or in the
hereafter shall exist, shall be held to apply in so far as the
same may be applicable."
Following the Act of 1903, Colorado law stood much as it does
today; there being both a general and a specific statute. To compound and confirm the confusion the Legislature, as a part of the
1911 lien act,4 enacted the following provision in a bill providing a

I

Colo.
2Cola.
aColo.
'Colo.

Laws 1899, c. 118.
Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 86-3-1 to 24 (1953).
Laws 1903, c. 141.
Laws 1911, c. 164.
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lien for miners, mill men and those furnishing materials for mines
and mills:
"Section 8. The provisions of this article shall apply to oil
wells or springs, iron and lead mines, as well as all other
mines not herein specified, so far as the same may be applicable."
The next succeeding section of that act stated that "all acts and
parts of acts in conflict" with the act are repealed.
The 1915 legislature specifically repealed the 1911 act in its
entirety. 5 The affirmative provisions of the 1915 act, which provide
the source for section 86-3-4 of Colorado Revised Statutes 1953
granted a lien to those persons who do work or who furnish materials, machinery, or other fixtures to mines, lodes, mining claims or
deposits yielding metals or minerals of any kind. Mercifully, nothing
was said in the section about "oil wells or springs."
This was the status of our statutory law by 1928, the year in
which the supreme court decided Poudre River Oil Corp. v. Carey6
and Terminal Co. v. Jones, 7 the only two Colorado authorities involving lien rights arising from oil and gas operations.
From the standpoint of legislative history only the Terminal
case is significant. Its facts, briefly, are these: The landowner had
given an oil and gas lease (we presume a Producers 88) covering
his 160 acre farm, reserving a 8 royalty. The lease was assigned to
Municipal Oil Co. Inc., a defendant in the action, which company
then entered into a drilling contract for an oil and gas test well with
Terminal Company, also a defendant. The terms of their contract do
not appear in the decision nor in the trial record, but from various
recitals in the decision it would appear that the agreement was in
the nature of a "turnkey contract," which obligated Terminal to
deliver a finished and cased hole. Whether it was also to deliver the
stationary drilling equipment for use during production cannot be
determined from the decision.
Terminal then constructed a derrick and rig, and a frame house
at the location, setting the rig on concrete corners and equipping it
with "rig irons, calf wheel irons, sand reel, steel crown block rig,
and other parts."8 Following erection of this equipment Terminal
entered into a subcontract under which the subcontractor was to
furnish all necessary drilling tools, labor and supplies for the drilling of the well in exchange for monetary compensation paid on a
footage-drilled basis. The plaintiffs in the action were employees of
the subcontractor; one as a carrier of equipment to the location, one
as a driller, and the third as a tool dresser. They all filed and foreclosed liens for labor against the oil and gas leasehold estate, the fee
estate, the rig, and all equipment and tools. They asserted their liens
not only under the provisions of the general lien law of 1899, but
also under the terms of the 1903 act.
Defendants contended that the 1903 act was unconstitutional
and that it had been repealed by the act of 1911, which in turn had
been repealed by the act of 1915. The rulings of the supreme court
on these questions are helpful in determining the status of our
'Colo. Laws 1915, c. 116.
'83 Colo. 419, 226 Pac. 201 (1928).
'84 Colo. 279, 269 Pac. 894, 59 A.L.R. 549, 550, 557 (1928).
Id. at 281, 269 Pac. at 896.
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present lien statutes. After finding the 1903 act constitutional, it
was concluded that:
(1) The act of 1911 did not expressly or impliedly overrule the 1903 act because there was no conflict in
their provisions and also because the 1911 act did not
puroprt to legislate on the entire subject contained in
the 1903 act.
(2) Even if the 1911 act were construed to repeal the 1903
act, such act (that of 1903) was effectively revived
upon the repeal of the 1911 act pursuant to the laws
of 1915. (This conclusion was reached, even after the
court cited and discussed the rule against implied
revival.)
(3) The act of 1899 is applicable, pari materia, with the
statute of 1903 and they must be construed together.
It is difficult to conclude how broadly or in what sense the
court intended to apply the rule of pari materia. To the extent
that the rule is capable of restatement, basically it requires all consistent statutes which can stand together and relate to the same subject, though enacted at different dates, to be treated prospectively
and to be construed together as though they constituted one actY
Was it meant in the Terminal case that the terms of the specific
statute controlled against and excluded such provisions of the general act which related to the same areas of law, with the statutes
existing cumulatively only as to those areas in which one was void
qf content? Or was it meant that all provisions of both statutes
existed coextensively and without exclusion as to each other on
an alternate basis? The questions posed by the redundancy of legislation in this area found little if any rest through the decision in
the Terminal case.
In 1929 the legislature enacted a second and more comprehensive statute granting liens to those who furnished labor, machinery, material, fuel, explosives, power or supplies for the sinking, repairing, altering or operating of any gas well, oil well or
any other well.' 0 It is this law which constitutes the source of our
present specific statute in this area."
Possibly the 1929 statute impliedly repealed the 1903 act, and
certain commentators so surmised,'2 but there was no express repealing provision in its contents. However, the question of such repeal is moot at this point because of the enabling act for the Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953.11 By such act any statutes or parts of
statutes not contained in the Revised Statutes were repealed as of
the effective date of the 1953 enactment; and the provisions of the
1903 act are not contained in the Revised Statutes. Further, any
question which might exist as to an implied revival of the 1911 act
is handily blocked by a specific provision in the 1953 act.
Upon review of these legislative occurrences the lawyer who
9Luchesi v. State Board of Equalization, 137 Cal. App. 478, 31 P.2d 800, 802 (1934); Burton v.
Denver, 99 Colo. 207, 61 P.2d 856 (1936); 50 Am. Jur.,Statutes § 348 (1944); 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 366
(1953).
1 Colo. Laws 1929, c. 123, p. 435.
11Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 86-5-1 to 11 (1953).
1 Lane, Mechanics' Liens in Colarado 44 (1948); and see annotator's note to Colo. Stat. Ann. Vol.
3B, c. 101, § 39 (1935).
13 Colo. Laws 1953, c. 63.
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attempts to appraise the law is inclined to feel somewhat like the
young lady at a cocktail party who after several drinks remarked
to her host, "You know, I feel more like I do now than at any time
since I've been here." He is faced with the facts that we perhaps
still have at least two statutes granting lien rights for labor and
materials expended upon oil and gas operations; that one is general
in its nature and one is specific; that the specific is even more specific than that specific act of 1903 (which enjoyed judicial interpretation), and that there are no current appellate decisions.
The remark that "we still have at least two statutes" is intentional. Quite possibly Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953, section 86-3-4,
granting a lien to miners might be viewed by some as a third statute
giving a lien to those who furnish labor or materials to an oil and gas
well. The fact that the provision in the 1911 act specifying application of the miners lien to an oil well was deleted from the 1915 statute militates against such a conclusion. However, the wording of the
1915 statute, particularly that which grants a lien to those performing work or supplying materials to a "deposit yielding metals or
minerals of any kind," leaves room for a finding that it can be
applied to oil and gas situations, and other states have so held in the
face of more restrictive terminology. 14 Whether the mining section
is a third statutory grant of lien is not felt to be generally significant
14Berentz v. Belmont Oil Co., 148 Cal. 577, 84 Pac. 49 (1906). Laborers working on the development of an oil well were entitled to a lien against the lessee's interest under the provisions of Code
Civ. Proc. 1 1183 (Stats. 1908, p. 84): "any person who performs labor in any mining claim or
claims, or in or upon any real property worked as a mine . . . has a lien upon the same, and the
works owned and used by the owners for reducing the ores from such mining claim or claims, or
real property so worked as a mine, for the work or labor done or materials furnished
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because the miners' lien proviso by its own terms,15 by judicial interpretation'6 and by renactment 17 is part of our general lien act.
Where, however, there are unitized oil and gas operations the lawyer
with a lien problem may wish to give this section careful attention,
and it is in this. connection that we shall discuss it separately in a
later installment. Otherwise, during the course of the article we
shall treat the miners' lien section merely as a part of the general
lien statute.
It is unfortunate that the specific lien statute relating to oil and
gas wells and operations was not also correlated to the general lien
law in the manner which was employed in the miners' lien law.
Since it is not so correlated, we are faced with the principal question, which we noted in our discussion of the Terminal case, of
whether (a) the general lien act and the specific act are coextensive
and cumulative in all their provisions and, therefore, may be employed conjunctively or alternatively in those areas of the law
where they both contain provisos, and further may be employed conjunctively in those areas of the law where only one legislates; or (b) the specific statute, being the later and more detailed
statute, is the exclusive statutory enactment as to those areas of lien
law in which it legislates, being cumulative only with the provisions
of the general statute which are required for a complete enjoyment
of such lien right given in the specific act. 18
We were unable to find any definitive answers to this query.
We know of no authority in Colorado bearing squarely on the question. The cases from those other jurisdictions which have both a
general and specific act relative to lien rights for labor and materials
furnished to oil and gas operations are of limited help because of
factual distinctions. In most of such states the statutes are similar to

0

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 86-3-4 (1953), incroporates the terms of § 86-3-1 by reference at three
different points. The original act also contained such references but to the applicable section of
Colorado Revised Statutes, 1908.
'- Chain O'Mines Inc. v. Lewiston, 100 Colo. 186, 66 P.2d 802 (1937)
17 Colo. Comp. Laws § 6445 (1921).
18 To illustrate the divergent results which occur when the two concepts ore applied, assume that
a roustabout is unpaid for his work in a given week, at the end of which he quit, and assume
further that the drilling of the well is not completed for another seven months. If the statutes are
considered coextensive, the claimant would have a maximum time for filing his lien statement
within 30 days after completion of the work. If the special statute is considered exclusive, the
claimant's maximum time for filing would be six months after the time he completed his work.
A more difficult question is presented where the specific statute does not contain a clear provision to cover the situation. For example, the question arises as to whether a copy of the lien
statement must be served upon the owner. If the statutes ore coextensive, clearly a copy must be so
served. If the specific statute is exclusive, it is probably not necessary to serve such a copy, although

it can be argued that this is an area in which the specific statute was not intended to be exclusive.

U..esT
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our 1903 act in that they give the right to a statutory lien and thereafter dictate that the same shall be enforced pursuant to the provisions of the general mechanics lien law of the state.19 In other
words, such statutes exist in a manner almost identical to that which
our miners' lien law now enjoys. Further, the Poudre River case
shows a reticence by our supreme court to be persuaded by decisions
which apply to the lien laws of other states, where there is any difference in wording.20
In this near void of authority it is possible to argue either side
of the stated question with some force. In contending that the acts
are coextensive in all their provisions it can be asserted that the
mandate in the specific statute 2 1 that such law is "cumulative" with
other lien laws is to be construed in its very broadest sense. As noted
in subsequent portions of this paper, however, such a purely literal
interpretation of this provision creates difficult problems in the
application of the two statutes relative to substantive rights.
There is room within the generally worded opinion of the
Terminal case to conclude that our supreme court meant, in holding
the 1903 and 1899 statutes to exist in pari materia, that all of the
provsions of both acts are to be applied alternatively and conjunctively. Conceivably, too, the court's decision in Chain O'Mines v.
Lewison1 implies a similar result. There the defendants attempted
to abridge the effect of the miners' lien section of the Compiled
Laws, 1921 (being the 1915 act). They argued that the mining section could not give a lien for labor upon operations outside the scope
of the general lien section, since the mining section specifically
referred to the general lien act. In answer the supreme court stated
that the lien section of the general act which became law in 1899
and also the lien provision of the mining statute, adopted in 1915,
must be viewed in the light that the legislative intention was to
broaden and not to restrict the scope of the general mechanics' lien
law. It is perhaps arguable, by analogy, that a like interpretation of
our specific oil and gas statute and the general lien law would yield
a finding that these two statutes exist coextensively. The difficulty
of such a position, however, lies in the fact that the 1915 act by its

-

Montana: Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 45-1003 (1947) reads: "The lien herein created (i.e., the
specific act) shall be enforced in the same manner, and the notice of same shall be given in the
same manner, and the materialmen's statement, or the lien of any laborer herein mentioned, shall
be filed in the same manner as now provided by the laws of Montana for materialmen's and
mechanics' liens, except that the time within which such liens must be filed shall be six months
instead of ninety days; and the method of procedure provided by the laws of the state of Montana
for enforcing materialmen's and mechanics' liens shall govern the enforcement thereof." Blose v.
House Oil and Gas Co., 96 Mont. 450, 31 P.2d 738 (1934) construed the statute as incorporating
even the provision of the general low prescribing duties of county clerks in indexing the lien.
Oklahoma, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 42, § 144 (1951), the specific act, was enacted with the state's
first comprehensive lien legislation; and § 146, with phrasing very similar to the Montana statute
quoted above, serves to incorporation the procedural provisions of the general lien act. While under
the general act the labor must be performed on the building and the material must be used in the
construction of it, that is not the case under the oil well lien statute. Consequently, a supplier of
tools or other third party whose materials do not end up embodied in the structure is protected only
in a well drilling enterprise. See Consolidated Cut Stone Co. v. Seidenback, 181 Okla. 578, 75 P.2d
442 (1938) and cases cited in the opinion.
Texas: Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5473 (Vernon 1956), Oil and Gas Lien Statute, dates from 1917;
and prior to its enactment, there was probably no statutory lien available to laborers and materialmen in the oil and gas industry. Oil Field Salvage Co. v. Simon, 140 Tex. 456 ,168 S.W. 2d 848
(1943). Art. 5476 provides that notice and other proceedings to secure and enforce to the lien shall
be advanced in the "same time and in the same manner" as provided for in the general lien chapter.
20Poudre River Oil Corp. v. Carey, 83 Colo. 419, 426, 266 Pac. 201, 203 (1928).
2 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 86-5-10 (1953).
2 100 Colo. 186, 187, 66 P.2d 802, 803 (1937).
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own terms quite clearly was intended as an amendment expanding
the scope of the general lien act.
To our minds the more acceptable construction, which is of
equal or greater compatibility with the Terminal decision, is based
upon our concept of a common sense application of the two statutes.
It has often been said that the law is really nothing more than good
common sense, as modified by statutes' and court decsions. Since the
modifications here are not clear, we can only recommend this construction to you as the proper one under the circumstances, not as
the most probable one.
To common sense, then. It should not be overlooked that the
mechanic's lien is "a creature of statute"' 3 and despite the general
tendency to construe mechanics' lien statutes liberally as to rights of
enforcement 4 the authority for the lien must still be found in the
statute. A careful reading of the general mechanics' lien sections
does not provide a clear basis for the claim of lien in situations involving oil and gas operations. It is our opinion that this gap was
filled by the 1903 act, which was intended to be the sole authority
for claiming a lien against oil and gas interests. Where a statute
adopted in 1899 gives a lien against property for work done and
materials furnished, and is couched in terms clearly identified with
the building construction trade, it is only logical to assume that an
act appearing in 1903 relating only to liens against oil and gas interests should provide the only means by which such a lien is to be
obtained. It has been
so held in at least one jurisdiction with com25
parable statutes.

We find implicit support for this position in the Poudre River
case. 26 The court's decision impliedly rules out any construction of
the general statute and specific statute as co-extensive. Had the
court considered this construction applicable, it could have avoided
the narrow question upon which the case was decided and found a
lien for the plaintiff based upon the general lien law.
2 Lane, Mechanics' Liens in Colorado 3 (1948).
244
Summers, Oil and Gas 115 (1938).
5
2 Ball v. Davis, 118 Tex. 534, 18 S.W.2d 1063 (1929).
" In our opinion, the Poudre River case reached a questionable result. The Court disposed of the
lien question hurriedly by distinguishing the oil and gas lien 'statute from other similar statutes as

being less broad in the scope of its language, and by pulling out of context the phrase "so furnished." The Court concluded that the use of the phrase "so furnished" showed the legislature's intent to provide a lien for the supplier against the property which he supplied-really a lien in the
nature of a purchase money mortgage. However

admirable such an intent might be, we believe that

it is contrary to the ordinary concept of the mechanic's lien, and that the legislature had failed to
express any

such

intent.
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We see nothing inconsistent between this interpretation of the
Poudre River case and the holding in the Terminal case that the
general act and the specific act of 1903 were to be applied in pari
materia. We believe that the Terminal holding means specifically
that those provisions of the general lien law which are necessary
and convenient to the enjoyment of the full benefits of the lien conferred by the specific statute
are applicable to the special lien as
27
well as to the general lien.

In view of this historical development of the special lien law,
it seems logical to conclude that a lien claimant against an oil and
gas interest obtains his basic right solely from the special statute.
Obviously, at the time of enactment, it was not thought that these
statutes gave two duplicate remedies; but, rather it was thought that
the remedy was given for two different situations. It is clear that
the legislature was fully aware of the existing general lien law at
the time the special provisions were enacted, since the various
enactments of the specific statute contained provisions to show that
the act was cumulative to the rights conferred by the general lien
law. Regardless of the manner of approach and of the statutes iden'n It seems to us to be more than coincidental that the 1929 act appeared in the first legislature
following the Poudre River and Terminal cases, although the 1929 enactment does not clearly dispose
of the problems disclosed or created by those decisions. This act closely follows the language and
format of the Wyoming statute (Wyo. Camp. Stat. Ann., c. 55, §55-401 to 413) (Supp. 1955),. originally enacted in 1919, insofar as the same applies to oil and gas interests, except for certain additional
sentences included in our act which are outside the natural pattern of the statute and from which
many of the problems attendant upon our present statute stem. Since the legislative history of the
1929 enactment cannot be reconstructed, either from the sponsor of the Colorado bill, or from the
legislative reference office of the Attorney General's office, we can only surmise that the 1929 act
was occasioned by the Poudre River and Terminal cases, and that it was patterned after the Wyoming statute.
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tified with it, therefore, if the situation is that of a claimant against
an oil and gas interest, it follows that the claim must be and is made
under the specific statute.
Upon this theory, the obvious conflicts between the two statutes
can be resolved. The specific statute, if applicable at all, is applicable
in all its provisions to the exclusion of any conflicting provision in
the general lien law.
This construction, at least in part, finds specific judicial
sanction, though not binding in Colorado. The Texas court was
faced with the very question with which we are concerned here in
construing similar Texas statutory provisions. 8 The court supplied
this excellent reasoning in relating the two statutes:
The fact is that at the time of the enactment of the special
act here involved (chapter 3, title 90, article 5473 et seq.)
the oil industry had assumed large proportions in Texas. It
was then apparent that it might become, as it has since
become, one of the major industries of the state; and it was
doubtless the opinion of the Legislature that the interests
of those in the business, whether as laborers, mechanics,
materialmen, or operators and owners, made it necessary
that their rights no longer be made to depend on general
statutes of, to say the least, doubtful construction and indefinite application and meaning; and so, in its wisdom,
because of the growing importance of the subject, and because of the number of people engaged in the industry, and
the values involved, enacted the special law to regulate,
govern, and control the special subjects named therein; but
as to general subjects which might be in the oil industry,
as in any other, such as the construction of buildings, liens
for accountants, clerks, repair men, etc., leave the general
laws, articles 5452, 5483, and 5503, as they were, applicable
The Court of Civil Appeals in Texas in the Ball case, note 29 infra, had decided the matter
according to the contention of the lien claimants that they were entitled to a lien under any one
of several statutory sections. The Supreme Court reversed the holding upon a logical analysis of the
Texos statutes, such as we have proposed for the Colorado statutes. The Court said:
.. The Court of Civil Appeals was of the opinion that Davis not only had a lien under
chapter 3, title 90. (articles 5473-.5479), relating to mechanic's liens on oil and mineral property but likewise had a lien for the work here done under chapter 2 (articles 5452-5472) of
that title, being the general statute relating to laborer's and mechanic's liens, also under
chapter 5 (articles 5483-5488) relating particularly to farm, factory, and store operatives,
and under articles 5503 to 5505, chapter 7, articles especially providing a lien for repair
of any article, etc.
'Chapter 3 of title 90, which embraces articles 5473 to 5475 of the Revised Statutes,
was originally enacted in 1917, and deals specially and particularly with the liens of
materialmen, artisans, laborers, and mechanics engaged in the oil industry. The Court
of Civil Appeals was of the opinion that, because article 5479 declares that these articles
relating specially to oil and mineral property should be cumulative as to rights and remedies given materialmen, artisans, laborers, and mechanics by other laws, that materialmen.
artisans, laborers, and mechanics in the oil industry could look to other chapters of title
90 for their liens. With this holding we cannot agree. By article 5473 materialmen, artisans,
laborers, and mechanics, for certain services, are authorized to fix liens against certain
properties for specifiedservices.
"The purposes of the declaration of cumulative effect was not, to make other statutory
provisions applicable to those covered by the act itself, but to show that the things for
which liens were given by the act were not intended to nullify other lien statutes in favor
of mechanics, laborers, clerks, and others performing services in the oil industry, and materialmen who might furnish material in the oil or mining industry not covered by a special
act."
The value of this case in Colorado is somewhat lessened by the fact that the court here was aided
by the emergency clause of the enactment which stated:
"There being no law protecting laborers and materialmen for labor performed for
owners of lands, mines or quarries or owners of leaseholds for oil, gas, pipe lines or rights
of way for mining or quarrying purposes, creates an emergency and imperative public
necessity exists that the constitutional rule requiring bills to be read on three several days
be and the same is hereby suspended and that this act take effect and be in force from
and after its passage, and it is so enacted."
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then to subjects not covered by article 5473, and still
applicable thereto.
The very purpose of special statutes is to make the law
plain and easily ascertainable, and to hold that the special
statutes as to the class of labor particularlynamed in article
5473 are not exclusive, but that various other statutes of a
general nature apply, adds confusion to the subject, and the
law becomes a trap, calculated to involve all but the most
astute in its toils. No such construction will be given it as
to those named and the classes of labor set forth and the
lien given in article 5473.29
This construction is also supported by the normal rules of
statutory construction that (1) the more specific statute controls,
and (2) the later statute controls. The application of these rules with
the application of statutes in pari materia was approved by the
Colorado court in the case of Burton v. Denver.30
It should be noted by way of caution that this construction is
not the panacea. Although it resolves, as a practical matter, the
conflicts in the statutes, it leaves unanswered the questions as to
what provisions are in conflict, and it points up the weaknesses and
conflicts within the specific statute itself. These, and the many
possible variations of the two views which we have expressed here,
will be discussed in the subsequent installments of this article in
which detailed questions of entitlement to the lien, notice and
priority are considered.
(To be concluded in a later issue of DICTA)
mBol v. Davis, 118 Texas 534, 18 S.W.2d 1065, 1066 (1929) (emphasis supplied).
mBurton v. Denver, 99 Colo. 207, 61 P.2d 856 (1936).
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